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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ANSWERING BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CLIFF PRINCE, dba PRINCE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The above-entitled action was commenced by the Plaintiff-
Respondent CLIFF PRINCE, hereinafter "PRINCE", doing business as 
the Prince Construction Company to recover damages from the 
Defendant R. c. TOLMAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., hereinafter 
"TOLMAN". The action arose out of the relation between PRINCE 
and TOLMAN as subcontractor and general contractor, respectively, 
of the Fishlake Sanitation District Project near Richfield, 
Utah. PRINCE was awarded judgment against TOLMAN in the 
approximate amount of $18,000 as damages resulting from 
TOLMAN's breach of an agreement made by and between the parties 
in connection with certain aspects of the construction project. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The above-entitled matter, pursuant to the stipulation 
of parties at pretrial, was bifurcated for purposes of trial. 
Issues relating to liability between the parties were tried 
before the Court, sitting without jury, on April 27 and 28, 
1977. After hearing the evidence and argument of the parties, 
the Court found in favor of PRINCE and against TOLMAN, both 
as to its liability to PRINCE and on its Counterclaim. The 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
matter was subsequently set down for trial on the issue of 
damages and was heard by the Court on March 24, 19 78. Then 
after, the court took the matter under advisement and on 
November 30, 1978 entered written findings and conclusions 
of law granting PRINCE judgment against Defendant TOLMAN in 
the amount of $18,386.34. 
TOLMAN also joined Western Surety Company, Inc., th; 
surety for PRINCE on the project, on its Counterclaim. Wes: 
surety cross-claimed against PRINCE and joined Genevieve A. 
Prince as general indemni tor under the bond issued by West. 
Surety. The trial court, finding that there were no breache 
by Respondent PRINCE, dismissed TOLMAN' s Counterclaim against 
PRINCE and Western Surety. Appellant TOLMAN is not appeali: 
the findings of the trial court relating to the dismissal o' 
its Counterclaim and consequently Wes tern Surety and Genevi1 
Prince are not Respondents to this appeal and are not befor: 
this Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL BY TOLMAN 
The Appellant TOLMAN seeks a reversal of the jud~e 
entered against it in the sum of $18,386.34 or, in the 
alternative, seeks a remand of the matter back to the trial 
court for recomputation of the damages awarded to PRINCE. 
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.n 
:h: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(Preliminary Statement) 
The Statement of Facts set out in Appellant's Brief 
is prefaced by Appellant's statement that "the facts of the 
case are basically set forth in the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law entered by the trial court". The Appellant 






by the trial court, sets out a version of facts which mis-
states the evidence and findings made by the Court and which 
contain matters entirely irrelevant to issues presented by 
this appeal. As a result, Respondent PRINCE is constrained 
to set out with care a statement of the relevant and material 
facts as found by the trial court below. 
The issues tried before the trial court fell into 
two categories: PRINCE'S claim for damages under an oral 
agreement between PRINCE and TOLMAN; and TOLMAN's Counterclaim 
which was eventually dismissed after trial. The award of 
damages to PRINCE was based upon an oral agreement reached 
1~ between PRINCE and TOLMAN relating to three i terns under the 
subcontract between PRINCE and TOLMAN. The Court found the 
existence of the oral agreement and also that TOLMAN was 
estopped to deny the agreement and its enforcement. 
It does not clearly appear whether TOLMAN 
appeals the findings of the trial court relating to the 
-3-
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making of the agreement and the liability issues found in 
1/ 
favor of PRINCE and against TOL~.AN.- TOLMAN also does not 
appeal the dismissal of its Counterclaim as against PRINCE 
and Western Surety. 
The following statement of facts sets out the general 
background relating to the contract between PRINCE and TOLMAl 
and those facts which related to the award of damages in 
favor of PRINCE. 
(Fishlake Project and Subcontract) 
on September 25, 1972, TOLMAN was awarded a contract 
by the United States Departl':lent of Agriculture Forest Servici 
hereinafter "Forest Service", to perform work in connection 
with the construction of a sewage transmission line with 
attendant lift stations, vaults and service road at Fishlake 
in Sevier County, State of Utah. The myriad items under the 
!/ Throughout its brief and particularly on page 6, TOLMAN 
makes reference to oral statements made from the bench by 
the trial court,evidently treating the statements as the 
court's findings. The court did make statements rel a ting to 
its findings from the bench. However, after further argumen1 
and the submission of proposed findings of fact from all 
parties, the court entered formal written findings of fact 
on November 30, 1978 (R.150-154). The written findings 
entered by the trial court supersede any oral statements mad1 
by the court a ~ reliance, if any, by TOLMAN on those state· 
ments is misplaced. See Newton v. State Road comrn'n, 23 
Ut.2d 350, 463 P.2d 565 (1970); In Re Astill's Estate, 14 
Ut.2d 217, 381 P.2d 95 (1963); Park v. Jameson, 12 Ut.2d W 
364 P.2d 1 (1961); In Re Roth's Estate, 2 Ut.2d 40, 269 P.2d 
278 (1954); Mccollum v. Clothier, 241 P.2d 468 (1952). 
-4-
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prime contract were either lump sum or, in most cases, unit 
price items. The total contract price subject to unit price 
quantity changes was set at $630,585. At the end of the 
contract, however, due to change orders and quantity changes, 
TOLMAN actually received in excess of $1 million under the 
contract with the Forest Service. 
On October 7, 1972 PRINCE and TOLMAN entered into a 
• 2/ 
subcontract agreement.- Under the terms of the subcontract, 
PRINCE agreed to perform eleven items under the prime contract 
between TOLMAN and the Forest Service. Each of the eleven 
i terns referred to the prime contract by ·mi t number and the 
Forest Service specifications were incorporated by reference 
into the subcontract between PRINCE and TOLMAN. The subcontract 
bebveen PRINCE and TOLMAN utilized the unit prices contained in 
the prime contract and set out estimated quantities for each 
of the eleven items. The items contained in the subcontract 
between PRINCE and TOLMAN are set out here for the convenience 
of the Court: 
ITEMS WITH UNIT 
APPROXIMATE PRICES WRITTEN UNIT APPROXIMATE 
QUANTITY UNIT IN WORDS PRICE AMOUNT 
42,000 C.Y. 2221-1 Excavate and Waste .80 33,600.00 
(Lagoons) 
17,500 C.Y. 2221-2 Embankment (Lagoons) .30 5,250.00 
~/ Trial Ex. Plaintiff's "A", R.l. 
-5-
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ITEMS WITH UNIT 
APPROXIMATE PRICES WRITTEN UNIT APP RO! 
QUANTITY UNIT IN WORDS PRICE ~ 
1,500 Cu.Y. 2805-1 Topsoil Furnished 1. 30 (Lagoons) 1,9~ 
125 M.G. 2231-1 Watering (Road, 
Lagoons, Misc.) 
60.00 7 .s~ 
80 Hours 2232-1 Rolling (Road, 20.00 1,6~ 
Lagoons, Misc.) 
3 Each 2718-1 Intercepting Dip 25,00 
1,650 C.Y. 2220-1 Roadway Excavation .so 8,, 
'· (Road) 
]_/ 
2,588 C.Y. 2222-1 Borrow (Road) .90 
25,880 Sta.Y. 2230-1 Overhaul (Road) .60 15,51i 
15,100 Yd.Mi. 2230-2 Overhaul (Road) 1.00 1s,rn 
700 C.Y. 2240-1 Crushed Aggregate 5.00 3,5« 
Grading C (Road) 
87,ll' 
Less 10% to R. c. Tolman 
The total subcontract price subject to adjustment 
based upon changed quantities was the sum of $87,257.20 l• 
10% of that amount which was to be paid to TOLMAN as the 
general contractor. 
3/ The .90 figure for item 2222-1 was a typographical er& 
and was recognized by the parties as actually $4. 00 per yd. 
Tr. 137. 
-6-
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In October of 1972, PRINCE commenced work under the 
subcontract. PRINCE and his crew worked through the fall of 
1972, stopping and commencing work as the weather permitted 
in accordance with Forest Service work stoppage and start-up 
orders of general applicability to the job site. By August 
of 1973, PRINCE had made substantial progress toward the 
completion of most items under the subcontract. 
(Oral Agreement Between PRINCE and TOLMAN) 
The basis of the proceedings below related to three 
items under the subcontract between PRINCE and TOLMAN; item 
nos. 2222-1, 2230-1 and 2230-2. The above three items are 
related, that is, they are performed by the contractor 
through the same operation, Item 2222-1 involves the excava-
tion of the earth and items 2230-1 and 2230-2 involve the 
method of computation of payment for the distances over which 
the earth must be hauled. The three iter J are highly profitable 
and are sometimes referred to as "loaded items". 
Throughout the early summer of 1973, PRINCE was delayed 
in performing the three items by virtue of the fact there was 
an open trench adjacent to the road along which the earth was 
to be hauled. TOLMAN had informed PRINCE that the hauls and 
borrow could not be completed until the trench was filled. 
By August of 1973 work under the three items was ripe for 
commencement, In order to perform the work, it was necessary 
for PRINCE to make arrangements for trucks, related equipment 
and operators. 
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At that time, PRINCE did not have sufficient equipme: 
on the job site in order to commence the overhaul under thosi 
items. Knowing that, PRINCE contacted Don Wirthlin, a liceru 
engineering contractor. Wirthlin agreed to supply dump truci 
to PRINCE and operators in order to complete the haul. The 
haul involved the moving of approximately 2, 500 cubic yards 1 
earth from a point specified by the Forest Service along a 
road and dropping the earth at various intervals. For the 
supplying of the trucks and operators, ~'lirthlin agreed with 
PRINCE that he would charge a flat sum of $3.00 per cubic 
yard of earth moved without regard to station or mile yards. 
4/ 
The cost approximated $7, 500. - Under that arrangement, PRINC 
stood to profit by approximately $ 30, 000 on the three i terns. 
In mid-August of 1973, PRINCE together with Ward 
Ragner, an employee, met with R. c. Tolman, the President of 
the Tolman Construction Company, at the job site at Fishlake 
PRINCE informed TOLMAN that he was ready to commence work 
on the three i terns. PRINCE explained to TOLMAN that he had 
made arrangements for trucks and operators through Don Wirth: 
TOLMAN then asked PRINCE what Wirthlin was charging for the 
use of the trucks and operators. PRINCE responded that 
Wirthlin was charging the sum of $3.00 per cubic yard. 
TOLMAN then told PRINCE that he could perform the work 
!/ Trial Transcript 97-102. 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cheaper since he had idle trucks and operators which could be 
utilized in order to make the haul and that TOLMAN would 
charge PRINCE only $3.00 per cubic yard, the price to which 
Wirthlin had agreed. It was agreed by the parties that TOLMAN, 
utilizing his trucks and operators, would proceed to make the 
haul and that the cost of $3.00 per cubic yard would be charged 
5/ 
against the swn due PRINCE under the contract.-
Immediately subsequent to that conversation with 
TOLMAN, PRINCE contacted Don Wirthlin and told him that it 
would be unnecessary for him to perform the work they had 
discussed relating to the three items. PRINCE then set out 
to perform other items under the contract,and,on the basis of 
his agreement with TOLMAN,PRINCE fully expected that the work 
would be performed by TOLMAN and that $3.00 per cubic yard 
would be charged against those items and PRINCE would receive 
the difference between the contract price and the $3.00 per 
cubic yard which was to be charged by TOLMAN. In September 
of 1973, TOLMAN performed the overhaul on the three items 
utilizing his idle trucks and machinery. 
TOLMAN subsequently submitted requests for payment 
under those items to the Forest Service and was paid an 
aggregate amount of $52,000, a sum which exceeded the original 
21 R.30-31· Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Paragraphs 6-7. 
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contract price due to changed quantities. PRINCE made claim 
against TOLMAN for payment under the subcontract as modified 
by their oral agreement. TOLMAN, however, refused to pay 
PRINCE, claiming that PRINCE had not performed the i terns and 
therefore was not entitled to payment. 
At trial, TOLMAN denied that he had made the oral 
agreement with PRINCE relating to the three items on the 
job site in August of 1973. The trial court specifically 
found, based upon the testimony of witnesses and the 
circumstances surrounding the agreement, that TOLMAN did, 
in fact, make such an agreement and that, additionally, he 
y 
was estopped to deny the existence of the agreement. Based 
upon those findings, which are not appealed by TOLMAN, the 
Court found that PRINCE was entitled to damages against 
TOLMAN for TOLMAN's breach of the contract based upon the 
difference between the subcontract price and TOLMAN' s actual 
cost in performing the three items. 
~/ During the course of trial, Respondent PRINCE elicited 
testimony from TOLMAN that TOLMAN had in his original bid to 
the Forest Service utilized profit margins in i terns 2222-1, 
2230-1 and 2230-2 to offset costs of another item. (Tr. W 
187) • Respondent PRINCE argued to the trial court that tow• 
the end of the project TOLMAN recognized the re la ti on betwe~ 
the three items and the subsidized item and was thus motivab 
to w~thhold payment to PRINCE. The trial court, however, 
declined to make a finding of bad faith on TOLMAN's part. 
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(Damages) 
The findings entered by the trial court below set 
out with detail the specific elements used by the trial court 
in its award of damages to Respondent PRINCE. The findings 
entered by the trial court are not disputed by TOLMAN. 
ARGUMENT 
(Preliminary Statement) 
The legal arguments set out in the three points of 
TOLMAN's brief are based upon erroneous factual premises. 
Each point assumes the validity of TOLMAN's factual claims 
at trial manifestly ignoring the findings of fact made and 
entered by the trial court. 
It is difficult for Respondent PRINCE to know, based 
upon the Brief of Appellant TOLMAN, the issues from which 
TOLMAN appeals. TOLMAN concec in his Brief that the facts 
are as found by the trial court and entered in the trial 
court's findings. Appellant TOLMAN claims that he appeals 
only the application of quantum meruit to the case and 
evidently disputes the measure of damages applied by the 
trial court. Despite those statements, TOLMAN sets out facts 
and arguments which have little or nothing to do with the 
theory of liability or the measure of damages applied by the 
trial court. In order to put the case in perspective and to 
align the issues it is necessary for Respondent PRINCE to 
set out the basic theory of liability upon which the Court 
awarrle>d judqincnt in favor of PRINCE. 
-11-
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND AN ORAL 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRINCE AND TOLMAN 
(Oral Agreement Between PRINCE and TOLMAN) 
Prior to August of 1973, the written subcontract 
between PRINCE and TOLMAN provided that PRINCE would perforl' 
the work under items 2222-1, 2230-1 and 2230-2. Those three 
items were critical to PRINCE since, as he testified at tria: 
7/ 
they were "loaded i tems"-bearing significant profit which 
offset losses on other contract items. PRINCE had experiem 
some delay caused by TOLMAN in performing the three items. 
Believing that t.'1e equipment he had on the job site would be 
occupied in the lagoon area, PRINCE made the arrangement wit 
Don Wirthlin to supply the trucks and operators necessary tc 
make the haul under the three items. PRINCE went to TOLMAN 
and explained his arrangements with Wirthlin to make the hai 
TOLMAN agreed at that time that he would make the haul ata 
price equal to or less than that of l'lirthlin. 
At that time, PRINCE and TOLMAN entered into an oral 
agreement which modified the written subcontract. TOLMAN 
agreed to perform the work under those i terns and in so doinc 
stepped into the shoes of Wirthlin, with respect to his 
relationship with PRINCE. Effectively, TOLMAN became PRINCE 
subcontractor. 
J./ R.225-227. 
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At the time of trial, Defendant TOLMAN suggested that 
the oral agreement, if made, was barred by the provisions of 
paragraph 10 of the subcontract which stated that the terms 
of the subcontract could only be changed or modified by a 
written agreement and that written consent to assign or 
further subcontract was required under paragraph 6 of the 
subcontract. This Court, however, in a number of decisions 
has held that parties to a written contract may orally change 
_y 
or modify the terms of the written contract. As this Court 
stated in Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc., 10 Ut.2d 53, 348 P.2d 
337, 339 (1960): 
It is a well-established rule of 
law that parties to a written contract 
may modify, waive, or make new terms 
notwithstanding terms in the contract 
designed to hamper such freedom. 
Favorably citing Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc., this Court in 
PLC Landscape Const. v. Piccadilly Fish 'N Chips, Inc., 502 
P.2d 562 (1972) stated: 
. there is nothing so sacrosanct 
about having entered into one agreement 
that it will prevent the parties enter-
ing into any such change, modification, 
8/ Wilson v. Gardner, 10 Ut,2d 89, 348 P.2d 931 (1960); 
Salzner v. Jos. J. Snell Estate Corp., 81 Ut. 111, 16 P.2d 
923 (1973). See also, Kenison v. Baldwin, 351 P.2d 307 
(Okla. 1960); Canada v. Allstate Insurance Company, 411 F.2d 
517 (5th Cir. 1969). 
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extension or addition to their arrange-
ment for doing business with each other 
that they may mutually agree. PLC at 563. 
The court below found that PRINCE and TOLMAN entered 
into an oral agreement which modified the subcontract agreeD 
TOLMAN was to perform the work under items 2222-1, 2230-1 ar, 
2230-2 and charge $3.00 per cubic yard against the price due 
PRINCE under the contract. PRINCE performed under the sub-
contract and was entitled to receive its benefits. TOLMAN, 
as prime contractor, collected the sums due under the three 
items but refused to disburse to PRINCE in accordance with 
the subcontract thereby breachingthe agreement. 
(Promissory Estoppel) 
The trial court also made findings and entered cone!: 
sions of law bearing on the issue of promissory estoppel. 
While the court found that an agreement had been reached 
between PRINCE and TOLMAN relating to the three items, the 
court also found that the strict elements of a contract need 
not be met in order to entitle PRINCE to judgment. 
The court found that TOLMAN promised PRINCE that he 
would perform the work under the three i terns at a cost equal 
to that of the Wirthlin bid. That promise was made by TOLMN 
with the reasonable expectation that PRINCE would forbear. 
In justifiable reliance on TOLtlAN' s promise, PRINCE did for-
bear, rot only by terminating the arrangements with \virthlin bu'. 
by taking no action himself. After making the promise, TOL~ 
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performed the work under the items, collected payment as the 
general contractor from the Forest Service and refused to pay 
PRINCE under the agreements. 
The trial court held that TOLMAN was estopped to deny 
the existence and enforceability of the oral agreement with 
PRINCE and his relationship as PRINCE's subcontractor. In 
so holding, the court relied upon a number of decisions in 
9/ 
this court applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel.-
The basis of the application of the doctrine is set out in 
Section 90 of the American Law Institute's Restatement of 
10/ 
Contracts which has been cited with approval by this court. 
Section 90 of the Restatement provides as follows: 
PROMISE REASONABLY INDUCING 
DEFINITE AND SUBSTANTIAL 
ACTION. 
A promise which the promiser should 
reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance of a definite and substantial 
character on the part of the promisee and 
which does induce such action or for-
bearance is binding if injustice can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise. 
The trial court found in favor of PRINCE on each of 
the elements necessary under Restatement 90 to assert promis-
sory estoppel. TOLMAN made a promise reasonably expecting to 
induce forbearance of a substantial character; PRINCE reasonably 
9/ J. P. Koch Inc. v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 534 P.2d 903 
(l975): Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (1974); Kelly v. 
Richards, 83 P.2d 731 (1938). 
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relied, forbearing on the performance to his detriment; and 
avoid injustice the court enforced TOLMAN's promise. 
Articulating the principle contained in Restatement 
this court in J.P. Koch Inc. v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc.,~ 
fn. 9, stated~ 
The invocation of estoppel does not 
necessarily involve any contract or 
agreement between the parties, conse-
quently, the elements of a contract are 
not involved and there is no requirement 
of consideration. It is a doctrine of 
equity to prevent one party from deluding 
or inducing another into a position where 
he will unjustly suffer loss. As appli-
cable here, the test is whether there is 
conduct, by act or omission, by which one 
party knowingly leads another party, 
reasonably acting thereon, to take some 
course of action, which will result in 
his detriment or damage if the first party 
is permitted to repudiate or deny his 
conduct or representation. 
This Court's analysis in Koch that the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel can be invoked without regard to the 
limitations imposed by traditional contract law has also be 
11/ 
followed in other jurisdictions.~ 
Thus, the trial court made a two-prong finding. It 
found, first, that a contract did exist between PRINCE and 
TOLMAN under which TOLMAN was to perform the haul as PRINC! 
subcontractor, and, secondly, that in a.ny case, TOLMAN,by 
11/ See, Janke Const. Co., Inc. v. Vulcan, 527 F.2d 772 (: 
Cir. 1976); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores Inc., 133 N.lv.2d 267 (Wis. 1965), 
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virtue of his conduct,was estopped to deny the existence of 
the agreement with PRINCE and that it was not in writing in 
compliance with paragraphs 2 and 6 of the subcontract 
agreement. The trial court, having found that TOLMAN was 
liable to PRINCE under the oral agreement, then considered 
the award due PRINCE by virtue of TOLMAN's breach. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT PRINCE 
Points II and III of TOLMAN's Brief appear to address 
the issue of the measure of damages utilized by the trial 
court in awarding judgment to PRINCE. Since the two points 
are so substantially related and since they both are based 
upon the same erroneous premise, Respondent PRINCE will treat 
both points concurrently. 
(Computation of Damages by Trial Court) 
The trial court, having once found that TOLMAN breached 
the oral agreement with PRINCE, awarded judgment to PRINCE in 
the sum of $24,316.33, less certain offsets, which reduced the 
judgment to approximately $18,000. At trial, Respondent PRINCE 
urged that the measure of damages should be as stated by the 
12/ 
court in I<eller v. Deseret Mortuary Cornpany"that the non-
breaching party should receive an award which will put him in 
QI 23 Ut.2d 1, 455 P.2d 197, 198 (1969). 
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as good a position as he would have been in had there been L 
breach". That is, Respondent urged the trial court to awari 
the contract price to PRINCE less the $ 3. 00 per cubic yard 
13/ 
agreed to by TOLMAN.~The trial court, however, declined to 
hold TOLMAN to the $3.00 per cubic yard price. Rather, tie 
trial court awarded PRINCE the subcontract price on the tire 
items less TOLMAN•s actual cost of performance of those ite: 
Additionally, the trial court refused to award PRIN[ 
increases in those quantities above the original estimates, 
Thus, the trial court found that the contract price to whict 
PRINCE was entitled was the sum of $39,586, the aggregateo: 
items 2222-1, 2230-1 and 2230-2. The court then subtracted 
from that figure the sum of $15, 269 which TOLMAN testified 1 
his actual cost in performing the three i terns. The rernainde 
yielded the sum of $24, 316. 33. Consistent with the subconh 
agreement, the court reduced the $24,316.33 by 10%, the 
general contractor's share. The court also allowed offsets 
in favor of TOLMAN, on other items, the total of which, 
including the 10% reduction, equalled $5,929.99. That figu: 
when subtracted from the $24,316.33 resulted in the final 
judgment of $18,386.34 awarded to PRINCE. 
13/ Additionally, PRINCE proffered testimony, which was 
excluded by the trial court, demonstrating consequential 
damages in view of the breach by TOLMAN. The court found 
those damages to be unforeseeable by the parties. 
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(Measure of Damages) 
The trial court applied the generally accepted measure 
of damages in a contract case. That is, it awarded to PRINCE 
the sum to which he was entitled -- the contract price. 
Indeed, for purposes of the relations of the parties, PRINCE's 
contract was performed and he was entitled to the contract 
price. Section 346(2) of the Restatement of Contracts states 
that rule: 
(2) For a breach by one who has 
promised to pay for construction, if it 
is a partial breach the builder can get 
judgment for the instalment due, with 
interest; and if it is a total breach he 
can get judgment, with interest so far 
as permitted by the rules stated in 
§337, for either 
(a) the entire contract price and 
compensation for unavoidable 
special harm that the defendant 
had reason to foresee when the 
contract was made, less instal-
ments already paid and the cost 
of completion that the builder 
can reasonably save by not 
completing the work; or 
* * * 
This Court reiterated that rule in Holman v. Sorenson, 
556 P.2d 499 (1976): 
It is the undisputed law of this 
state and the general consensus of legal 
writers that breach of a construction 
contract damages are based upon the 
total amount promised for the project, 
less the reasonable cost of completing 
it. 
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While TOLMAN had promised to complete the three itei 
for $3.00 per cubic yard, he claimed his actual cost to bet 
times that figure. TOLMAN has complained that the trial co, 
utilized quantum meruit improperly. However, any error in 
that regard inured to the benefit of TOLMAN. That is, the 
trial court allowed TOLMAN's actual cost to be offset again: 
the contract price, rather than holding him to his agreement 
at $3.00 per cubic yard. The trial court's references to 
quantum meruit were strictly in an attempt to allow TOLMAN 
his actual costs. 
(Appellant TOLMAN Urges the 
Application of an Inapposite Rule) 
TOLMAN's entire argument with respect to the assessi 
of damages is based on an erroneous factual predicate. TOil 
contrary to the findings entered by the trial court, assM~ 
that TOLMAN, under paragraph 2 of the subcontract, took over 
the three i terns because of the default of PRINCE. The entir 
argument advanced in the brief flows from that proposition. 
The cases cited by Appellant have application to that 
circumstance. Had the trial court so found, the cases cite' 
by TOLMAN would have color able pertinence. They are, howeve 
irrelevant. 
The trial court found that PRINCE performed undertl 
subcontract through TOLMAN as his subcontractor under an or' 
agreement. It appears that the gravamen of Appellant's 
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; complaint is that PRINCE should not have received the award 
t because he did not perform the work under the three items. 
That proposition, however, ignores the promises and agreement 
of TOLMAN and the damages which resulted to PRINCE occasioned 
by TOLMAN's own conduct, Appellant cannot be heard to complain 
about the court's utilization of quantum meruit which clearly 
benefited TOLMAN. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues and arguments advanced by the Appellant 
substantially deviate from the issues tried and resolved by 
the trial court. As a result, meaningful response to those 
arguments is substantially impeded. Nevertheless, Respondent 
has set out the theory and basis of the trial court's ruling 
and its award of damages, both of which are supported by 
the record. TOLMAN entered into an oral agreement with PRINCE 
to which he must and should be held. The trial court so found 
and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MIC~Y~) 
of and for ·/ 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CLIFF PRINCE, dba PRINCE 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
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